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Abstract
Background: Indonesia is one of the largest consumers of tobacco in the world, however there has been little
work done on the economics addiction of tobacco. This study provides an empirical test of a rational addiction
(henceforth RA) hypothesis of cigarette demand in Indonesia.
Methods: Four estimators (OLS, 2SLS, GMM, and System-GMM) were explored to test the RA hypothesis. The
author adopted several diagnostics tests to select the best estimator to overcome econometric problems faced in
presence of the past and future cigarette consumption (suspected endogenous variables). A short-run and long-
run price elasticities of cigarettes demand was then calculated. The model was applied to individuals pooled data
derived from three-waves a panel of the Indonesian Family Life Survey spanning the period 1993-2000.
Results: The past cigarette consumption coefficients turned out to be a positive with a p-value < 1%, implying
that cigarettes indeed an addictive goods. The rational addiction hypothesis was rejected in favour of myopic ones.
The short-run cigarette price elasticity for male and female was estimated to be-0.38 and -0.57, respectively, and
the long-run one was -0.4 and -3.85, respectively.
Conclusions: Health policymakers should redesign current public health campaign against cigarette smoking in
the country. Given the demand for cigarettes to be more prices sensitive for the long run (and female) than the
short run (and male), an increase in the price of cigarettes could lead to a significant fall in cigarette consumption
in the long run rather than as a constant source of government revenue.
Background
The World Health Organization has developed the WHO
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control [1]. This
framework is an evidence-based agreement that reaffirms
the right of all people to the highest standard of health,
and represents a paradigm shift in developing a regula-
tory strategy to address addictive substances. The key
tobacco control policies as reflected in the WHO Frame-
work Convention on Tobacco Control are based on sup-
ply and demand reduction strategies. The demand
reduction provisions include two main approaches: price
and tax measures and non-price measures.
Increasing cigarette prices via excise taxes has been
recognized as one of several strategies to curb tobacco
consumption [2]. To control tobacco use, policymakers
need to know the magnitude of price elasticity of
demand for cigarettes. This information is important if
increasing prices (i.e. through a tax on cigarettes) is
used as a measure to control tobacco smoking while at
the same time maximizing revenue. The importance of
estimating elasticities of demand for cigarettes is there-
fore in its use for pricing and tax simulations. Not sur-
prisingly, dozens studies that estimates price elasticities
of demand for cigarettes have been done elsewhere [2,3].
Economists have increasingly examined addictive beha-
viors of smoking in theoretical and empirical economic
models. A standard economic model assumes that consu-
mers demand goods (including cigarettes and other
tobacco products) in order to maximize their utility sub-
ject to a set of constraints such as prices, income, and
other factors. This implies consumption decisions at a
given point in time are independent of past choices [3].
Since cigarettes are highly addictive products (due to nico-
tine [4]), decisions regarding their consumption at any
moment depend on previous choices. That is, a smoker
who is addicted to a cigarette product must by definition
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or larger quantities as before to maintain the addiction.
Similarly, a smoker will suffer significant adjustment costs
if consumption is stopped.
Chaloupka and Warner [2] have divided economic
models of addiction into three groups: imperfectly
rational, myopic, and rational. These models differ in the
assumptions made about the extent of rationality among
consumers of addictive products. The former models
assume stable but inconsistent short-run and long-run
preferences, i.e., individuals’ preferences are not consis-
tent over their life-cycle. In myopic models, individuals
recognize the dependence of current addictive goods
consumption on past consumption, but ignore the
impact of current and past choices on future consump-
tion decisions when they make current choices. Whilst in
the rational addiction (henceforth RA) models, indivi-
duals incorporate the interdependence between past,
current, and future consumption into their utility-
maximization. This is in contrast to the assumption,
implied in myopic models of addictive behavior, that
future implications are ignored when making current
decisions. In the RA models, individual recognizes the
addictive nature of goods and decides to consume it
because his/her pleasure gains are greater than the cost
of the activity which includes health problems and lower
utility later in life. The RA model [5] has become a stan-
dard approach in the analysis of addictive goods, and
such model has been tested empirically to study numer-
ous products, see Auld and Grootendorst [6] for reviews.
Key important factor contributes to the popularity of the
RA model is that such model has important policy impli-
cations, i.e., optimal taxation of addictive and harmful
goods must include only the external costs that this
behavior causes on other members of the society.
On this other hand, psychological studies of harmful
addiction also have introduced three basic dimensions of:
tolerance, withdrawal and reinforcement (positive effects
of habits) that are now part of the formal economic mod-
els of addictive behavior [7]. Tolerance indicates that a
given level of consumption is less satisfying when past
consumption has been greater. In other word, a higher
level of consumption is needed in the future to have the
same utility for the given level of current consumption.
Withdrawal denotes the loss of satisfaction following
consumption cessation. For instance, smoker does not
get any nicotine that produces unpleasant physiological
symptoms. Whilst reinforcement means that greater cur-
rent consumption of addictive good causes its future con-
sumption to rise, e.g. smoking becomes an established
habit. Thus, reinforcement dimension requires that past
cigarette consumption motivate present consumption by
increasing marginal utility derived from cigarettes more
than the present value is reduced through the marginal
harm from future consumption.
Addicts in public health point of view refer to psycho-
logical disorder, i.e. smokers acquire habit formation to
the act of smoking, and physical addiction to nicotine.
This view starts from the observation that smoking is
bad for the smoker’s health, and then goes on to con-
clude that individuals do not derive benefits from smok-
ing. Whilst in economic sense, addicts is in fact a
combination of habit and preference adaptation which
starts with subjective individual preferences where indi-
vidual’s smokers reveal that they gain net utility (or
satisfaction) from tobacco consumption. From the above
perspectives, it implies that addicts in public health are
among the addicts in the economist sense where addicts
in the latter’s construct picks out a larger dimension.
This study provides an empirical test of the RA of
cigarette demand in Indonesia, a country that represents
a significant contributor to the global burden of disease
from tobacco-related illnesses. With the fourth largest
population in the world, Indonesia in 2002 ranked as
the fifth largest consumers of cigarettes (182 billion)
behind China (1.7 trillion), USA (463 billion), Russia
(375 billion), and Japan (299 billion) (Ahsan A, Wijono
N: The impact analysis of higher cigarette price to
employment in Indonesia, submitted). Cigarettes con-
sumed increased from 33 billion in 1970 to 217 billion
in 2004. Our study adds evidence to the existing empiri-
cal works for testing the RA hypothesis which yield
mixed results, and are often described as less than con-
vincing due to implausible discount rates, unsteady
demand and low price elasticities [5,6,8-10]. Addiction
in our study is a combination of habit and preference
adaptation. For public health priorities, our model indi-
cates that “addiction” can be conditioned and does
respond to incentives. So for both revenue and health
policymakers, we provide a methodological innovation
for analyzing how tobacco tax policy can maximize rev-
enue given public health goal or vice versa.
Methods
Model Specifications
The RA models assume that consumers take into
account all future effects of their present consumption
to maximize life-time utility or happiness [5]. Consu-
mers realize the future harm and utility of their current
consumption decisions. The quantity of current cigar-
ettes consumption depends on past (lag) consumption,
future (lead) consumption, prices of cigarettes, and
other factors as follows:
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Page 2 of 10where i is an individual, t is time, C is consumption of
cigarettes, Pc and Pa is the price of cigarettes and alco-
hol, respectively, x’ is a vector of exogenous variable
that affect consumption of cigarettes, υi is individual
fixed effects that control for the agent time invariant
preferences and marginal utility of wealth, dt are time
fixed effects to control unanticipated changes in wealth,
and εit is the error term.
Equation (1) allows for direct tests of addiction and
rationality. The statistical significance of the coefficient
of future consumption, Ct+1, together with a reasonable
estimate of the discount rate, gives a direct test of a RA
model against an alternative model in which consumers
are myopic addicts [5,9,10]. For addictive goods, equa-
tion (1) implies that current consumption is positively
related to past consumption, with the degree of addic-
tion reflected by b1. Similarly, given the assumption of
rational behavior and the symmetry present in the
model, future consumption (b2)h a sap o s i t i v ei m p a c t
on current consumption.
The ratio of the coefficient on the lead to that on the
lags, b2/b1, gives an estimate of the discount factor [6].
The implied discount rate is computed using this
expression (b1/b2 - 1). The effects of price on demand
for cigarette can be obtained from the solution to the
second-order difference equation (1). Coefficient esti-
mate of the cigarette prices indicates the short run elas-
ticity, whilst the long run elasticity is computed using
the following expression:
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Estimators
Applying ordinary least squares (OLS) in equation (1)
could lead to biased parameter estimates for two rea-
sons. First, εit may be serially correlated with and
through suspected endogenous variable Cit-1 and Cit+1.
Second, equation (1) was derived assuming perfect cer-
tainty on prices and other variables [5], and thus when
unexpected changes in these variables causes individuals
to revise their consumption plans at each time period.
Thus, Cit+1 should be seen as the planned future con-
sumption, which may or may not be equal to the rea-
lized future consumption if there unexpected changes in
period t + 1, implying there is measurement error when
we use actual values of Cit+1.
Instrumental variables (IV) techniques are often used to
estimate equation (1) due to endogenous of lagged and
future consumption variables [6]. Here, we consider three
estimators: two-stage least square (2SLS), Generalized
Method of Moment (GMM) and system-GMM. The 2SLS
is a two-step estimation procedure to correct endogeneity
of the regressors. In particular, variables Cit-1 and Cit+1 are
regressed in the first stage on known, observed personal
characteristics (exogenous right hand side equation (1))
and the instruments zi, as follows:
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where Cit* are Cit-1 and Cit+1; zi are the potential
instruments, and all else is as defined in equation (1).
This stage generates predicted values for the endogen-
ous proxy variables. The dependent variable is then
regressed on all exogenous right hand side variables and
the predicted values derived from the first stage
regressions.
The 2SLS only assumes simultaneous exogeneity for
Pit and xit , and does not eliminate υi in (1). Thus,
the endogeneity of Cit-1 and Cit+1 a r el i k e l yt ob ew o r s e .
A within transformation of equation (1) was done to
eliminate υi with the following transformation in first-
differences [11]:
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where t = 3,...,T-1. Equation (3) allows one to apply
instrumental variable techniques without assuming strict
exogeneity of Pit and  xit.
Our strategy is to find a set of instruments zit that are
uncorrelated with Δεit and correlated with the regressors,
and apply GMM to equation (3) using the orthogonality
condition that E(zit, Δεit ) = 0. The GMM estimator pro-
duces consistent estimate where hetersoskedasticity (or
non-constant variance) arise, and asymptotically efficient
estimates of the parameters of interest when the errors
are serially independent [12]. The estimator does estima-
tion on a set of orthogonal conditions which are the pro-
ducts of equations and instruments [13].
GMM and system-GMM are also used to deal with
errors-in-variables and unobservable heterogeneity
[11,14]. Given that GMM estimator with too many over-
identifying restrictions perform poorly in finite samples
[10,13], we applied the methods, developed by David
Roodman [15] and implemented “xtabond2” module for
STATA, of reducing the bias caused by too many overi-
dentifying restrictions. A finite sample correction was
applied to the robust two-step covariance matrix calcu-
lated for system-GMM estimator.
We utilized several diagnostic tests to evaluate the
overall specifications of the models, and to select the
most appropriate estimator. An endogeneity test was
employed using the Hausman specification tests. If both
Cit-1 and Cit+1 indeed exogenous, we would opt to OLS,
otherwise either 2SLS, GMM or system-GMM call for.
While to single out between 2SLS and GMM estimator, a
various Pagan and Hall’s (1983) test for heteroskedasticity
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selection doesn’t end at this stage. Moreover, the consis-
tency of the coefficient estimates of IV approach and the
endogeneity test are dependent on the accuracy of instru-
ments used. We employed several IV tests to evaluate
whether there may be a bias from weak instruments and
whether the instruments are orthogonal to the error
process.
Data and Variables
This study used individual aggregated data obtained
from three-wave a panel of the Indonesian Family Life
Survey (IFLS) data, conducted in 1993 (IFLS1), 1997
(IFLS2) and 2000 (IFLS3). Frankenberg and Karoly
(1995), Frankenberg and Thomas (2001), and Straus et
al. (2004) described more fully IFLS1, IFLS2 and IFLS3,
respectively [17-19].
IFLS contains measures of smoking behavior from
individuals aged 15 and above. Table 1 gives definition
and descriptive statistics of the variable. We measure
cigarette consumption (the dependent variable) as the
number of cigarettes per day smoked as recalled by the
individual at the time of the interview. The main expla-
natory variable is the number of cigarettes smoked as
recorded in previous wave (Ct-1) and in the next wave
(Ct+1) from the current interview. These variables mea-
sure the effects of past and future cigarette consumption
on current marginal utility of cigarette consumption.
We included measures of cigarette (Pct) and alcohol
(Pat) prices at the time of the interview. Other time-
varying explanatory variables included a monthly
income proxy (from expenditure recall data), expressed
as a real value with 2,000 CPI data. To obtain a per-
equivalent adult measure of consumption, all income
proxy data was adjusted for family size.
Instrumental variable techniques can only be applied if
one finds instruments that satisfy two requirements:
they (the instruments) must be correlated with the
endogenous variable(s) and are orthogonal [12]. Appro-
priate instrumental variables in our context will play an
important role in determining past and future consump-
tion (a potentially endogenous variable) but will not
affect current consumption (the dependent variable)
except through past and future consumption. Here, we
proposed lagged and lead prices serving as instruments
for past and future cigarette consumption. Following
Grossman et al. (1998) [20], we included variable that
measure some of the life cycle events (e.g., lagged and
lead individuals working status) as the instruments. This
variable affects utility, and therefore partially determines
εit. We avoided lagged values of cigarette consumption
as instruments for lead consumption due to concerns
about serial correlation in the errors. Other dummy
variables, which we consider to be proxies for wealth or
economic stability, were also included as potential
instruments: dwelling walls are brick; dwelling floor is
permanent; dwelling is owned (1/0); and individual’s
religion.
Results
Descriptive Statistics
Seventy-seven percent of male age above 15 years
reported to have ever smoked habit in 1993, compared
to 69 percent in 1997 and 70 percent in 2000 (Table 2).
In all datasets, current smoking rates only slightly lower
than ever-smoking rates, correspondence to a very small
quitter rates, less than 5 percent. The majority of male
smokers smoke cigarettes relative to other products. In
IFLS 2000, about 93 percent of male smokers chose
cigarettes compare to only 1 percent chewing tobacco.
Table 1 Definition of variables used in the models and its descriptive statistic
IFLS 1993 IFLS 1997 IFLS 2000 Pooled
Variable Definition Mean SD. Mean SD. Mean SD Mean SD.
Ct0 Current cigarette consumption (ln) 2.162 0.789 2.233 0.745 2.210 0.722 2.207 0.746
Ct-1 One lag cigarette consumption (ln) n.a n.a 2.156 0.776 2.234 0.748 2.203 0.760
Ct+1 One lead cigarette consumption (ln) 2.242 0.739 2.218 0.717 n.a n.a 2.230 0.727
Pct0 Current price cigarette (ln) 4.169 0.665 4.407 0.245 5.374 0.168 4.623 0.701
Pct-1 One lag price cigarette (ln) n.a n.a 4.156 0.669 4.405 0.245 4.280 0.520
Pct+1 One lead price cigarette (ln) 4.403 0.246 5.369 0.166 n.a n.a 4.882 0.526
Pat0 Current price alcohol (ln) 7.673 1.129 8.374 1.076 9.331 1.024 8.612 1.263
Ln-exp Monthly per-capita income (ln) 10.629 0.863 11.079 0.812 11.891 0.848 11.156 1.004
Working 1 if working, 0 otherwise 0.611 0.488 0.549 0.498 0.592 0.491 0.582 0.493
Wall 1 if dwelling wall is brick, 0 otherwise 0.519 0.500 0.610 0.488 0.660 0.474 0.588 0.492
Floor 1 if dwelling floor is permanent, 0 otherwise 0.191 0.393 0.149 0.356 0.112 0.316 0.155 0.362
Hhown 1 if dwelling is owned, 0 otherwise 0.794 0.404 0.823 0.382 0.805 0.396 0.805 0.396
Moslem 1 if Moslem, 0 otherwise 0.858 0.349 0.877 0.328 0.882 0.322 0.871 0.335
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female reported to have ever smoked habit in 1993 and
decrease to 6 percent in 2000. In contrary to male,
female prefer to chew tobacco, over 55%, than smoke
cigarettes. On average, male started smoked earlier than
female (21 vs. 27 years of aged). The figure is consistent
in all data. Average number of cigarettes smoked per
day is about 12. There are no significant changes in the
number of cigarettes smoked between 1993, 1997 and
2000. But, male smoke approximately 30-40 percent
higher in the average number of cigarettes smoked per
day than female. Since female differ substantially in the
frequency and amount of cigarette consumed from
males, we perform our analysis separately for male and
female.
Model Selections
The endogeneity test, Durbin-Wu-Hausman and Wu-
Hausman, for the entire samples was 3.5 and 6.9,
respectively, with a p-value of 0.031 (Table 3), reject the
null hypothesis of exogeneity. The suspected endogen-
ous variable indeed endogenous (p-value for male and
female sample was 0.06 and 0.04, respectively), suggest-
ing OLS results in inconsistent parameter estimates.
To discriminate either 2SLS or GMM, we utilize
results of the Pagan and Hall’s test for heteroskedasticity
Table 2 Descriptive statistics (mean) of smoking behavior in Indonesia
IFLS 1993 IFLS 1997 IFLS 2000 Pooled
Female Male Total Female Male Total Female Male Total Female Male Total
Ever-had smoking habit 0.12 0.77 0.42 0.07 0.69 0.35 0.06 0.70 0.36 0.08 0.71 0.37
Still having smoking habit 0.10 0.70 0.38 0.06 0.64 0.33 0.05 0.65 0.34 0.07 0.66 0.34
Stop smoking 0.02 0.07 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.03
Cigarettes 0.38 0.81 0.74 0.41 0.90 0.85 0.48 0.93 0.89 0.42 0.89 0.84
Self-rolled cigarettes 0.12 0.28 0.26 0.07 0.17 0.16 0.06 0.12 0.11 0.09 0.18 0.17
Chew tobacco 0.55 0.02 0.10 0.55 0.01 0.07 0.49 0.01 0.05 0.53 0.01 0.07
Smoke a pipe 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Starting smoke, age (yrs) 27.2 21.5 22.3 27.7 20.5 21.4 27.3 20.4 21.3 27.4 20.8 21.6
# cigarettes smoked/day 7.4 11.3 11.0 7.9 12.6 12.3 7.0 12.2 11.8 7.4 12.1 11.7
Table 3 Summary statistics test for selecting the best estimator
All sample Male Female
Statistics: P-val Statistics: P-val Statistics: P-val
Endogeneity test:
a. Lagged and lead consumption
Wu-Hausman F(2,1775): 3.5 0.031 F(2,1711): 2.8 0.061 F(2,56): 3.32 0.043
Durbin-Wu-Hausman Chi
2(2): 6.9 0.031 Chi
2(2): 5.6 0.061 Chi
2(2): 6.79 0.034
b. Only lagged consumption
Wu-Hausman F(1,1776): 5.1 0.031 F(1,1712): 3.6 0.057 F(1,57): 0.00 0.983
Durbin-Wu-Hausman Chi
2(1): 5.1 0.031 Chi
2(1): 3.6 0.056 Chi
2(1): 0.00 0.982
c. Only lead consumption
Wu-Hausman F(1,1776): 0.2 0.637 F(1,1712): 0.2 0.636 F(1,57): 6.12 0.016
Durbin-Wu-Hausman Chi
2(1): 0.2 0.636 Chi
2(1): 0.2 0.635 Chi
2(1): 6.21 0.013
Heteroskedasticity test(s):
Pagan-Hall general test Chi
2(11): 15.5 0.159 Chi
2(11): 16.2 0.133 Chi
2(11): 9.05 0.618
Pagan-Hall test w/assumed normality Chi
2(11): 34.1 0.000 Chi
2(11): 36.7 0.000 Chi
2(11): 7.69 0.741
White/Koenker nR2 test Chi
2(11): 16.4 0.128 Chi
2(11): 17.0 0.107 Chi
2(11): 17.00 0.108
Breusch-Pagan/Godfrey/Cook-Weisberg Chi
2(11): 36.9 0.000 Chi
2(11): 39.8 0.000 Chi
2(11): 13.44 0.265
Overidentifying restrictions test:
Sargan N*R-sq (2SLS) Chi
2(6): 8.7 0.192 Chi
2(6): 10.4 0.108 Chi
2(6): 0.96 0.987
Basmann test (2SLS) Chi
2(6): 8.7 0.193 Chi
2(6): 10.4 0.108 Chi
2(6): 0.79 0.992
Hansen J (GMM) Chi
2(6): 8.0 0.237 Chi
2(6): 9.8 0.132 Chi
2(6): 1.07 0.983
Hansen J (GMM-system) Chi
2(33): 20.1 0.962 Chi
2(33): 21.7 0.934 Chi
2(33): 8.53 1.000
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null hypothesis of homoskedasticity, and thus at this
stage the 2SLS estimator is preferred. Whilst for total
and male samples, the heteroskedasticity test with
assumed normality and the Breusch-Pagan/Godfrey/
Cook-Weisberg test rejected the null hypothesis at the 1
percent level. This gives evidence for opting GMM
instead of 2SLS estimators.
Selecting either GMM or system-GMM for male sam-
ple, and choosing either 2SLS or system-GMM for
female sample are performed based on several instru-
mental variables tests. A reduced form regression of the
lags and leads consumption (equation 2) on the full set
of instruments was estimated. The results are presented
in Table 4. We adopted several statistical criteria to
investigate whether the instrument (i) correlate with the
lagged and future consumption and (ii) are orthogonal
to the errors process. The former implies the instru-
ments must be relevant and valid.
The relevancy of instruments was investigated by eval-
uating R
2 in the first-stage regression of equation (2)
[21]. Our R
2 reveals the models explained a relatively
high proportion of the variation for the suspected endo-
genous. For the entire samples, R
2 for the lagged and
future consumption was 13% and 12%, respectively. As
our models have two suspected endogenous variables,
relying only on R
2 and F-test may not be enough to
detect the relevance of the instruments. Hence, we used
aS h e ap a r t i a lR
2 measure, which takes into account the
inter-correlations among the instruments [22,23].
Table 4 also reports both Partial R
2 and Shea Partial R
2.
An estimated equation that yields a large value of the
Partial R
2 and a small value of the Shea measure indicat-
ing the instruments lack sufficient relevance to explain
all the endogenous regressors, and the model may be
essentially unidentified [21]. With the exception of
female sample, a gap between Partial R
2 and Shea partial
R
2 is considerably low, and thus our models are well-
identified.
The relevance of the instruments was also investigated
using F-test to determine whether they correlated with the
potentially endogenous regressors [24]. The null hypoth-
esis of the F-test that the parameters of the covariates are
jointly equal to zero was rejected, indicating the instru-
ments are jointly significant. However, values of the F-test
gives little doubt on the relevance of the instruments.
Ac o n s e r v a t i v er u l eo ft h u m bf o ras i n g l ee n d o g e n o u s
regressor is that the F-test less than 10 is an indicator of a
Table 4 First-stage regression of the lags and leads consumption: OLS estimates
Total Male Female
Lag Lead Lag Lead Lag Lead
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Pct0 -0.364
† 0.075 -0.232
† 0.069 -0.373
† 0.076 -0.257
† 0.068 0.232 0.521 0.328 0.510
Pa t0 0.252
† 0.020 0.227
† 0.018 0.257
† 0.020 0.226
† 0.018 0.144 0.123 0.216
‡ 0.121
Ln-exp -0.011 0.023 0.018 0.021 -0.008 0.024 0.034 0.021 -0.041 0.136 -0.378
† 0.133
Pct-1 0.055* 0.027 -0.016 0.025 0.052
‡ 0.028 -0.030 0.025 -0.022 0.153 -0.007 0.150
Pct+1 -0.081 0.118 -0.301
† 0.108 -0.067 0.121 -0.288
† 0.108 -0.534 0.663 -0.719 0.649
Workingt+1 -0.063 0.047 0.153
† 0.043 -0.057 0.048 0.148
† 0.043 -0.37
‡ 0.198 -0.132 0.194
Workingt-1 0.150
† 0.053 0.085
‡ 0.049 0.113* 0.057 0.028 0.051 0.186 0.206 0.010 0.202
Wall -0.121
† 0.034 -0.041 0.031 -0.120
† 0.034 -0.053
‡ 0.031 -0.396 0.246 -0.127 0.241
Floor -0.239
† 0.049 -0.079
‡ 0.045 -0.244
† 0.050 -0.086* 0.045 -0.114 0.338 -0.479 0.331
Hhown -0.050 0.039 -0.038 0.035 -0.040 0.039 -0.016 0.035 -0.356 0.276 -0.735
† 0.270
Moslem -0.193
† 0.053 -0.137
† 0.048 -0.198
† 0.053 -0.117
† 0.048 -0.028 0.356 -0.818* 0.349
Constant 2.261
† 0.550 2.925
† 0.504 2.197
† 0.565 2.904
† 0.506 3.883 2.876 8.286
† 2.816
# N 1783 1783 1719 1719 64 64
# regressors K 6 6 6 6 6 6
# instrument L 12 12 12 12 12 12
# excl. instrum. 8 8 8 8 8 8
R
2 0.133 0.124 0.137 0.130 0.191 0.361
Shea Partial R
2 0.031 0.021 0.033 0.020 0.112 0.176
Partial R
2 0.036 0.024 0.034 0.021 0.16 0.253
F-test of:
- all instrument 24.77
† 22.69
† 24.58
† 23.16
† 0.37 2.67
†
- excl. instrument 8.22
† 5.43
† 7.53
† 4.54
† 1.24 2.2*
‡significant at 10%; *significant at 5%;
†significant at 1%; SE is robust standard errors.
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Page 6 of 10weak instrument [21]. In our full sample (see last row of
Table 4), F-test all instruments for the lagged and lead
consumption were 25 and 23, respectively, whilst F-test
excluded instrument F-(8; 1176) were 8 and 5 for the
lagged and lead consumption, respectively. For female
sample, results of the F-test even yielded worse perfor-
mance, less than 2.
The validity of the instruments was tested by over-
identification restrictions test. A Hansen’s J-statistic, and
both Sargan’s and Basmaan’s statistic tests were used in
t h ec a s eo fG M Ma n d2 S L Sr e s p e c t i v e l y( T a b l e3 ) .T h e
joint null hypothesis of these tests is that the excluded
instruments are valid instruments (i.e. uncorrelated with
the error terms), and that they are correctly excluded
from the estimated equation. The test is distributed as a
c2 with degrees of freedom equal to the number of
exceeding instruments. The critical value of the c2a t
the 95% level of significance with 6 degrees of freedom
is 8, we therefore cannot reject the null of no overiden-
tification. This suggests that the models are reasonably
well specified and the instruments are valid.
Finally, the instruments are not only required to be
correlated with the endogenous variable(s), they will also
need to satisfy an orthogonal requirement [12], i.e. the z
should be exogenous. We tested a subset of instruments
using C-statistic test. that allowed us to test a subset of
the original set for orthogonality conditions. Unfortu-
nately, orthogonality requirements of the instruments
cannot be satisfied. The C-statistics test, except for
female, could not reject the null hypothesis of exogene-
ity. This implies that our subset instruments are endo-
genous. Both C-statistics test and F-test give more
evidence for not using GMM estimator.
Estimation Results
Results for cigarette demand equation (1) are shown in
Table 5. The last row of the Table presents price elasti-
cities of demand, discount factor and discount rate of
time preference.
Pooled OLS with robust cluster standard errors, for the
entire sample as well as for male and female separately are
reported in Table 5. OLS ignores the endogeneity of the
lags and leads consumption. For the full sample, coeffi-
cient estimates of the leads and lags consumption are sig-
nificant, and hence rejecting the myopic model in favor of
future looking consumers. The future consumption term
coefficient is higher than the lagged one giving rise to a
negative discount rate. Price of cigarettes (negative) and
alcohol (positive) were significant, but income was not.
The findings on prices are the same when applied to male
Table 5 Rational addiction cigarette consumption estimates: model comparisons
Total Male Female
OLS 2SLS GMM System GMM OLS 2SLS GMM System GMM OLS 2SLS GMM System GMM
Ct-1 0.244
† 0.520
† 0.521
† 0.846
† 0.238
† 0.485
† 0.487
† 0.790
† 0.415
† 0.114 0.292 1.096
†
[0.021] [0.113] [0.112] [0.130] [0.022] [0.110] [0.110] [0.126] [0.117] [0.517] [0.449] [0.382]
Ct+1 0.318
† 0.133 0.119 -0.749
† 0.315
† 0.137 0.123 -0.761
† 0.293
† 0.866* 0.806* -0.243
[0.027] [0.152] [0.145] [0.078] [0.028] [0.151] [0.150] [0.080] [0.104] [0.386] [0.365] [0.230]
Pct0 -0.154
† -0.118
‡ -0.129
‡ -0.358
† -0.151
† -0.127
‡ -0.138
‡ -0.384
† -0.362 -0.367 -0.289 -0.567
[0.045] [0.070] [0.066] [0.084] [0.046] [0.073] [0.072] [0.087] [0.261] [0.337] [0.320] [0.575]
Pat0 0.182
† 0.152
† 0.157
† 0.253
† 0.184
† 0.159
† 0.163
† 0.234
† 0.158 0.019 -0.006 0.448
‡
[0.019] [0.035] [0.035] [0.060] [0.019] [0.037] [0.037] [0.062] [0.110] [0.139] [0.133] [0.225]
Ln-exp -0.021 -0.016 -0.015 0.023 -0.027 -0.019 -0.017 0.03 0.131 0.286
‡ 0.294
‡ 0.037
[0.018] [0.018] [0.018] [0.056] [0.018] [0.019] [0.019] [0.058] [0.098] [0.155] [0.154] [0.309]
Constant 0.469* 0.333 0.36 1.455
‡ 0.527* 0.422 0.44 1.832* -0.528 -1.489 -1.966 -1.494
[0.226] [0.351] [0.354] [0.768] [0.231] [0.374] [0.372] [0.776] [1.327] [1.848] [1.764] [2.369]
N 1790 1783 1783 1783 1725 1719 1719 1719 65 64 64 64
R-squared 0.41 0.33 0.33 0.40 0.34 0.34 0.45 0.25 0.27
F-test 181.45
† 104.72
† 81.72
† 27.63
† 171.7
† 79.72
† 80.96
† 26.34
† 9.9
† 5.06
† 5.76
† 2.51
‡
# instruments 12 12 39 12 12 39 12 12 39
# excl. instruments 8 8 8 8 8 8
Short-run elasticity -0.154 -0.118 -0.129 -0.358 -0.151 -0.127 -0.138 -0.384 -0.362 -0.367 -0.289 -0.567
Long-run elasticity -0.352 -0.340 -0.358 -0.396 -0.338 -0.336 -0.354 -0.395 -1.240 -18.35 2.949 -3.857
Discount factor 1.303 0.256 0.228 -0.885 1.324 0.282 0.253 -0.963 0.706 7.596 2.760 -0223
Discount rate -0.233 2.910 3.378 -2.130 -0.244 2.540 2.959 -2.038 0.416 -0.868 -0.638 -5.510
‡significant at 10%; *significant at 5%;
†significant at 1%; Robust standard errors in [brackets].
Note: See equation (1): The short run price elasticity is the coefficients estimates of cigarette price, b3; the long run price elasticity is calculated using the
expression     EL n C EL n P c it it () / ( )/ ( )   31 2 1 ; and the implied discount factor is b2/b1 and the implied discount rate is b1/b2-1.
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Page 7 of 10and female sample. While the signs and the significance
levels of the coefficients are the same, the magnitudes are
different. The short run price elasticity of demand for
males and females, for instance, was estimated to be -0.15
and -0.36 respectively. The demand to be slightly higher
price sensitive in the long run, with an estimated elasticity
of -0.34 and -1.24 for males and females, respectively.
Table 5 also reports the 2SLS and GMM regression
allowing for the endogeneity of lead and lagged con-
sumption. The instruments used are those described in
data and variables section. All standard errors are het-
eroskedastic consistent. Both 2SLS and GMM produces
statistically significant results for variables lagged con-
sumption, cigarettes price and alcohol price. One can
observe that the magnitudes of prices variables are
almost similar from both 2SLS and GMM estimates.
The patterns hold true for the full sample, as well as
for male and female samples. For males, the coefficient
of lead consumption has a positive sign and is smaller
than the coefficients of lagged one. This finding is con-
sistent with the theory, which rises to a positive rate
and reasonable time preference. Since it is insignifi-
cant, however, the RA hypothesis is rejected in favor
of the myopic one. The estimated short run prices
elasticity of cigarettes for male is -0.13 (in 2SLS) and
-0.14 (in GMM), and the long run prices elasticity
become triple, -0.34 (2SLS) and -0.36 (GMM). For
female, we find demand to be substantially price sensi-
tive in the long run, with an estimated elasticity of
-18.3 (2SLS) and -2.95(GMM), compared to the short-
run price elasticity which is only -0.37 (2SLS) and
-0.29 (GMM).
Our primary results are displayed in Table 5, labeled
system-GMM. This estimator increases the number of
valid instruments, 38 in system-GMM compared with
only 12 in both 2SLS and GMM estimators. For the
total and male samples, all parameters estimates pro-
duced by a system-GMM, except monthly per-capita
income, were statistically significant at the 1 percent
level. Whilst for female sample, only the lagged con-
sumption (p-value < 1%) and alcohol price (p-value <
10%) turned out to be statistically significant. A posi-
tive value of the lagged consumption (p-value < 1%)
suggests that the effect of dependence, reinforcement
and tolerance is significant. However, the lead con-
sumption coefficient term turned out to be a negative,
suggesting the RA model is rejected in favor of the
myopic one. For male sample, the short and long run
price elasticity of cigarette was estimated to be -0.38
and -0.39, respectively, and is significant at the 1% per-
cent level, while for female, it was estimated to be
-0.57 and -3.89 for short and long run elasticity,
respectively.
Discussion
This study tests the RA hypothesis using OLS, 2SLS,
GMM, and system-GMM estimators. The former estimator
produces consistent estimates of the coefficients and of
their standard errors only when the regressors are exogen-
ous and the error term is homoskedastic and serially uncor-
related [25]. The three later estimators allow one to control
endogeneity of the regressors [14,26], but they are generally
less efficient than OLS. Thus, there is a trade-off between
loss of precision and having biased parameter estimates.
Since arriving at the choice of most appropriate model is a
difficult process but not often documented in the literature
in great details, we describe a series of criteria that helped
us selecting the most appropriate econometric technique in
such a case.
We find the evidence for endogeneity of both lagged
and future consumption. This led us to apply the meth-
ods that treat regressor as endogenous. While 2SLS has
been applied widely to test the RA model [6,27-30],
among other to correct the endogeneity problem, we
leave such estimator out for two reasons. First, unknown
hetersoskedasticity exist, especially in the total and male
samples, and this lead to give an invalid inference since
the standard error is inconsistent [23]. Second, results of
the instrumental variable tests indicating little doubt of
the excellence our instruments, in particular for female
sample where the F-test less than 10 [21]. The later raises
concern on the use of GMM estimator as well. Thus, we
conclude that system-GMM estimator is probably the
best to estimate our dynamic specifications model.
The RA hypothesis is accepted when the coefficient of
the future consumption is a positive and significant, and
when the discount rate has a reasonable value [5,9,31].
Our finding rejects the RA hypothesis in favor of myo-
pic one. Estimates derived from a system-GMM yielded
a significant negative value of the coefficient associated
to the future consumption, and therefore the estimated
value of the discount factor was implausible.
A rational smoker engages in a rational learning pro-
cess, balances the utility value of smoking with expected
utility loss and selects the efficient risk level [3]. This
behavior doesn’t hold true for Indonesian smokers. They
neglect future consequences of smoking risks, and
ignore the impact of current and past choices on future
consumption decisions when making current choices.
This may due to smokers underestimate tobacco’sd a n -
ger relative to other health risks, and they fail to fully
internalize these risks. Unfortunately, we are unable to
test this assumption within our models and empirical
specifications.
Nevertheless, the findings that Indonesian smokers are
irrational, e.g. they are myopic addicts, are an important
message for public health policy. Anecdotal, tobacco
Hidayat and Thabrany Harm Reduction Journal 2011, 8:6
http://www.harmreductionjournal.com/content/8/1/6
Page 8 of 10industries in the county provide more attractive and
thorough advertisement as well as provide many favor-
able messages about smoking on their products than
public health campaign do. If we believed that smokers
are misinformed about a key risk of smoking, our find-
ings would imply that policy makers may need strategies
that would change smokers’ perceptions about a key
risk of smoking. In light of this view, the promotion of
more informed and responsible smoking should become
policy objective. Policy makers have to redesign current
public health campaign against cigarette smoking in the
country.
Another important finding from this analysis is very
interesting. Cigarette consumption is found to be nega-
tively related to price, and the long-run cigarette price
effects (or equilibrium multiplier) exceeded the short-
run effects. From a public health perspective, these find-
ings are of substantial interest, suggesting an increase in
the price of cigarettes via excise taxes could lead to a
significant fall in cigarette consumption in the long-run.
Future increase in the tax will reduce the number of ex-
smokers returning to cigarettes and will reduce con-
sumption among continuing smokers. They also will
induce some smokers to quit and prevent others from
becoming regular or persistent smokers [2]. Empirical
evidence from South Africa shows that a doubling of
the real price of cigarettes between 1993 and 2003
w o u l dr e d u c ec o n s u m p t i o nb yaq u a r t e ri nt h es h o r t
term [32]. These gains would be significant in South
Africa or any other country struggling with the public
health consequences of high rates of tobacco consump-
tion like in Indonesia.
Our study also finds the long-run cigarette price
effects for female are greater than one, in absolute
value, implying the demand to be more elastic in the
long-run than in the short-run. A long-run price elasti-
city of -3.85 among female smokers indicates that
increasing cigarette prices via excise taxes can be an
effective tool to reduce cigarette consumption for this
population. However, since the demand for cigarettes is
more elastic in the long-run, further excise tax increases
are more likely to act as a tobacco control mechanism
in the long-run rather than as a constant source of gov-
ernment revenue. In such a case, price increases brought
about by higher taxes would cause government revenue
to decrease as the proportionate change in prices would
lower the proportionate change in consumption.
The short-run elasticity of cigarette demand gives the
percentage variation in the consumption of cigarette in
the first year after a permanent change in the current
price and all future prices, with past consumption held
constant. Whilst Hu and Mao [33] argue that cigarettes
price elasticities are higher in developing countries than
in developed countries due to the relatively low incomes
level in developing countries that makes people react
more sensitively to price changes, the short-run price
estimates in our study are quite comparable to other
developed countries, range between -0.25 to -0.5 [2].
Our short-run price estimates coincides with the pre-
vious study in the country by Djutaharta et al. (2005)
who found a ten percent increase in cigarette prices
lowered the demand by 3.4 percent [34].
Conclusions
This study estimates the demand for cigarette in Indo-
nesia according to the rational addiction framework.
The demand equation is tested on individuals aggre-
gated data taken from three-wave a panel of the Indo-
nesian Family Life Survey covering the periods 1993-
2000. We explore several estimators, and select the
best alternative one to overcome the econometric pro-
blems faced in presence of endogenous or predeter-
mined variable. Findings confirm that while the effect
of dependency, reinforcement and tolerance is signifi-
cant (and hence cigarette is an addictive good), the
rational addiction hypothesis is rejected in favor of
myopic one. This finding calls health policymakers to
redesign current public health campaign against cigar-
ette smoking. We also find demand to be more price
sensitive in the long-run (and female) than the short-
run (and male), suggesting an increase in the price of
cigarettes could lead to a significant fall in cigarette
consumption in the long-run. The short-run cigarette
price elasticity for male and female is estimated to be-
0.38 and -0.57, respectively, and the long-run one is
-0.4 and -3.85, respectively.
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